The organizers pitch the event thus:
Are real numbers real? Mathematical Platonism says yes: terms in theories of mathematics are abstract ideal objects that truly exist out there, outside of spacetime; and mathematical theorems are true precisely because they describe these abstract objects correctly. Fictionalism says no: theories of mathematics do indeed purport to refer to abstract objects, but these objects do not exist (not even as mental states or physical states of the world). Consequently, fictionalism says, mathematical theorems are not true (but possibly, also not false). The debate between these two views of mathematics has been ongoing since at least the time of Plato. While both sides of the debate may seem, upon first glance, counterintuitive and mysterious, yet it has genuinely been difficult to find a convincing alternative account on the truth-status and truth-condition of mathematics. This coming Monday on Mar. 10th, the debate continues at the Philosophy Society.
Arguing for mathematical fictionalism will be Professor Matti Eklund, Chair Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University. His work spans metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of language. Most importantly, he authored the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Fictionalism.
Arguing against mathematical fictionalism will be Daniel Kodsi, Lecturer in Philosophy at Magdalen College Oxford. During his DPhil he has written on causation, free will, and of course, a critique of mathematical fictionalism.
The actual subject of the "debate" is evidently Fictionalism and Professor Eklund's packaging of the subject, and hence I am wont to accuse the organizers of appropriating a silly question in order to drum up attendance, and perhaps more importantly maintain the viability of the institutional context, which, if I may pun on the term in question, is a fiction of another sort. Compare Francis Bacon's Idols of the Theatre.
In any event, here are my remarks:
It is not a matter of real or not. The question is: how are numbers used as tools to solve problems and do things? Asking "Are they real?" is not an appropriate response to the phenomenon. Numbers (real numbers, negative numbers, irrational numbers, imaginary numbers, and so on) have a grammatical legitimacy insofar as they are meaningful utterances in the stream of life.
A related matter, please click HERE.
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